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A
maintained assumption of nearly all macroeconomic analysis is that
households prefer their consumption to remain smooth across time
and states of nature. Their ability to smooth consumption is affected
byavarietyofconstraints,includingﬁscalpolicy,and,inparticular,thechoice
of tax base. In practice, labor income and interest income on savings have
constituted the bulk of taxed activities. However, the preceding forms of taxa-
tion create potentially important distortions. Prescott (2004) shows that labor
income taxes may be important in depressing labor supply and average in-
comes to inefﬁcient levels, whileAtkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) show that
it can never be optimal to tax capital income in the steady state. In particular,
capital income taxes hinder the household’s ability to smooth consumption
intertemporally by lowering the return on savings.
An alternative tax that avoids the hurdles to smoothing created by capital
income taxes is a tax on consumption. In general, however, consumption
taxes have been opposed on the basis that they are “regressive” in the sense
that, at any point in time, the revenues may be disproportionately collected
from households whose incomes are lower than average. Households in the
U.S. economy also face substantial persistent and uninsurable idiosyncratic
risks to their income (see, e.g., Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron [2004]). As
a result, many with currently low income will be those who have suffered an
adverse shock in the past. From this perspective, a tax system that collects a
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substantial portion of its revenues from those who ﬁnd themselves with low
income may seem undesirable.
Evaluating the burden of tax payments by income requires choosing a
deﬁnition of income by which to order households. Two candidates are (i)
income received in a given year and (ii) income realized over the lifetime.
For each of these deﬁnitions, one can compute the regressivity of a given tax
regime. The ﬁrst measure of incidence, which we term annual incidence,
will compare the cumulative contributions to tax collections of households
collected at a point in time, and then ranked by current (annual) income. The
second, which we refer to as lifetime incidence, will compare the cumulative
contributionstotaxcollectionsofhouseholdsrankedbytheirrealizedlifetime
income.
Some have noted that the measured incidence of consumption taxes de-
pends on the notion of income being used. Notably, Metcalf (1997) shows
that while the annual incidence of consumption taxes appears regressive, the
lifetime incidence is roughly proportional. In particular, when income is de-
terministic and has a “hump” at middle age, relatively young households can
expect income to grow, while relatively old households can expect income to
fall. Under the presumption that households prefer smooth consumption, the
young will generally borrow, if allowed, while the old will run down assets
to ﬁnance consumption in retirement. This behavior implies that households
will consume large amounts relative to their income when young while the
reverse will hold when old. As a result, any cross-sectional assessment of
“who pays” a consumption tax will conclude that it is paid disproportionately
by the currently relatively poor. However, this apparent regressivity is merely
an artifact of households successfully achieving smooth consumption.
The preceding intuition was derived in a purely deterministic setting.
However, the logic extends to the more general case where income has both
deterministic and stochastic components. In stochastic settings, people in any
cross-sectional data will differ even if they share many characteristics such
as age, gender, and education. However, the nature of the shocks that lead a
priori similar households to differ matter for the assessment of the effects of
tax policy. In particular, given the variance of innovations to income faced
by a household, its ability to smooth consumption in the absence of complete
insurance markets depends crucially on the persistence of shocks. Loosely
speaking, the more that annual income “looks like” long-run average income,
the more informative annual incidence of consumption taxes will be. When
shocks are transitory, a current shock to productivity will have less inﬂuence
on the lifetime resources that a household can expect over its remaining life-
time. As a result, consumption levels will not need to be adjusted by much
in order for the lifetime budget constraint to be satisﬁed. In turn, unless the
household is near a constraint on borrowing, its consumption will not re-
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income risk, a household who has just received a bad shock may expect more
ofthesameinthenearandintermediate-termfuture;thus,expectedlifetimere-
sources have to be revised downward, possibly signiﬁcantly (see, e.g., Deaton
[1992]). Therefore, satisfaction of the household’s lifetime budget constraint
will require a commensurate reduction in current and future consumption.
Conversely, if a household receives a good realization of a persistent shock,
consumption is likely to jump up as lifetime expected resources are revised
upwards.
From a policymaker’s perspective, the issue is this: the less closely that
consumption tracks income, the more effective we can say that consumption
smoothing is. However, annual incidence measures will suggest regressiv-
ity. As a result, consumption taxes may appear undesirable in precisely those
instances in which households are successful in managing the impact of in-
come ﬂuctuations on their standard of living. The preceding is a relevant
consideration: A relatively large body of work has shown that households
engage in signiﬁcant consumption smoothing over their lifetimes (see, e.g.,
Attanasio et al. [1999] and Gourinchas and Parker [2002]). In contrast to
annual incidence, lifetime incidence will not be distorted by the effectiveness
of household consumption smoothing.
Unfortunately for policymakers, recent work has debated the persistence
of income shocks (which are taken to represent productivity shocks), with
estimates that lie substantially away from each other. At one end of the spec-
trum are the estimates of Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) who argue
that aggregate cross-sectional evidence suggests a unit-root component for
shocks. At the other end of the spectrum are the more recent estimates of
Guvenen (2007), who has argued that shock persistence is in fact far lower,
andinanAR(1)setting,betterapproximatedbyapersistenceparameterof0.8.
Giventhislargerange, wepresenttheimplicationsofaswitchtoconsumption
taxes under a variety of values for shock persistence and show that measured
regressivity does depend on the persistence of shocks.
In this article, we address two questions. First, how will a move to pure
consumption taxation matter for aggregate outcomes, and how do the re-
sults depend on the persistence of shocks to productivity? Speciﬁcally, under
varying shock persistence, how do the levels and variability of consumption,
wealth, and labor supply respond to this tax reform? Second, how regressive
are consumption taxes? Do annual and lifetime incidence measures of con-
sumption taxes differ, and how do the results depend on the persistence of
productivity shocks? Speciﬁcally, we utilize the Suits Index (Suits 1977), a
standard measure of the incidence of taxes, to determine how regressivity de-
pends on (i) the frequency at which income is measured and (ii) the stochastic
structure of idiosyncratic household productivity. We will then describe the
relationshipoftheSuitsIndextodirectcross-sectionalmeasuresofinequality,
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Given our objectives, it is essential that we face the household with a
stochastic productivity process that accurately captures both the true nature
of household risk and the tools with which households smooth consump-
tion. Therefore, our model features a stochastic process for productivity that
contains a transitory component, a persistent component, and a well-deﬁned
“hump-shaped” life-cycle proﬁle for average productivity. We equip house-
holds with the two tools thought to be empirically most relevant for consump-
tion smoothing: self-insurance through asset accumulation, and ﬂexible labor
supply. Our work is most closely related to Fullerton and Rogers (1991) and
Metcalf (1997), who study the dependence of measured regressivity on the
frequency of income measurement, though in stylized models that abstract
from uncertainty. Given the potential for uncertainty to alter consumption
smoothing, our article contributes to the literature by allowing for stochastic
shocks of varying persistence and ﬂexible labor supply. It is also related to
Ventura (1999), Nishiyama and Smetters (2005),Athreya andWaddle (2007),
and Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2008). Our work differs from
prior work as it derives the implications for tax incidence as a function of the
stochastic properties of income.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. In terms of aggregates, we ﬁnd that a
move to a consumption tax will increase savings taken into retirement but will
notaltereitherlaborsupplyorconsumptionvariabilitysubstantially. Thelevel
of inequality does vary with the persistence of productivity shocks, especially
when using lifetime measures of the relevant variables. With respect to re-
gressivity, our results show that the ﬁndings of Metcalf (1997) carry over to a
substantiallyrichersetting: Weshowthatregressivityisameasurethatisquan-
titatively sensitive to the frequency of income being used. Our results obtain
in spite of the fact that borrowing constraints bind for most households early
in life. While annual incidence shows substantial regressivity, the lifetime
incidence of a consumption tax is proportional, irrespective of the persistence
of income shocks. Perhaps the central lesson of our article is that standard
measures of the incidence of consumption taxes can be rather misleading as a
guide to its implications for household consumption smoothing.
In what follows, Section 1 lays out some intuition for the role played by
consumption taxes. Section 2 presents the model and equilibrium, Sections 3
and 4 present the parameterization and results, and Section 5 concludes.
1. WHY MIGHTA SWITCH TO CONSUMPTION TAXES
MATTER?
First,weprovidesomeintuitionforwhyaswitchtoconsumptiontaxationmay
indeed alter the optimization problem faced by agents. Notice that in some
verysimplesettings,taxsystemsthattaxbothlaborincomeandcapitalincome
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As a result, the move to a consumption tax from a regime of labor and capital
income taxes is not inherently a meaningful change, as it may not change
the household’s underlying optimization problem. Following Nishiyama and
Smetters (2005), it is instructive to consider a simple two-period model in
which households enter with zero wealth (a1 = 0), work only in the ﬁrst
period of life whereby they earn a deterministic wage, w1, pay a ﬂat tax on
labor income, τl, and save an amount, a2. In the second period, households
are taxed on their capital income at a ﬂat rate, τk, and live off gross-of-interest
(andnet-of-capitalincometax)savingsa2(1+r(1−τk))inthesecondperiod.
The per-period budget constraints are as follows. In the ﬁrst period, we have
c1 + a2 = w1(1 − τl),
and in the second period we have
c2 = (1 + r(1 − τk))a2.
In the absence of borrowing constraints, the relevant constraint on house-





(1 − τl)(1 + r(1 − τk))
= w1.
Next, consider the same environment, but where labor and capital income
taxeshavebeenreplacedbyconsumptiontaxesalone. Inthiscase,thelifetime
budget constraint is




Inspecting (1) reveals that a regime in which consumption taxes in period
1 are set at τc1 ≡ 1
1−τl − 1 and τc2 ≡ 1+r
[1+r(1−τk)](1−τl) − 1 generates identical
incentives and constraints for the household. In this case, a system of ﬂat
capital and labor income taxes is equivalent to a system of consumption taxes
that vary with age. The age-dependency of the equivalent consumption tax
regime is a direct result of nonzero capital income taxation: τc1 = τc2 if
τk = 0. Thus, whenever τk  = 0, it is as if future consumption is being taxed
at a rate different from current consumption. In particular, a positive capital
income tax implies that τc1 <τ c2: Future consumption is more expensive
than current consumption.1
1 It is for this reason that Erosa and Gervais (2001) emphasize that wherever a consumption
tax system would be optimally age-dependent, but is unavailable for exogenous reasons, positive
ﬂat capital income taxes can be used along with labor income taxes to acheive the same outcome.80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Moregenerally, inalonger(butstilldeterministicandﬁnite-lived)model,
ﬂat capital and labor income taxes are equivalent to a regime in which there
are (i) an age-dependent sequence of consumption taxes, {τcj}J
j=1 , and (ii)
a lump-sum transfer, ϒ0, to all households to offset the difference in present
values of labor income created by the presence of capital income taxes. That
is, the equivalent consumption tax at any age j=1,2,...,J,is given by
τcj =
(1 + r)j
(1 + r(1 − τk))j(1 − τl)
− 1,
where we see again that if τk = 0, τcj = 1
1−τl ∀ j = 1,...,J. Letting  wj
denote income/productivity while the lump-sum transfer to households under









(1 + r)j .
Noticeagainthatwhenτk = 0,thereisnoage-dependenceinthesequence
of consumption taxes, nor is there any transfer (i.e., ϒ0 = 0).
Given these cases, we now turn to the aspects of our preferred model that
breaktheequivalencebetweenconsumptiontaxregimesandthoseregimesthat
taxlaborandcapitalincome. Firstofall, likebothrecenttaxreformproposals
and analyses, we will consider a move to a regime of a ﬂat consumption tax,
implemented here as a ﬂat sales tax on all household purchases.2 These are
among the most practical forms of consumption taxes under consideration in
policy discussions. Notably, the inherent difﬁculties in implementing age-
dependent taxes perhaps account for the fact that they are not a feature of
any major economy. The absence of age-dependence then immediately rules
out any equivalence with income taxes. Second, the interest rate on savings
in the model is strictly positive. As a result, regardless of the size of capital
income, as long as it is positive, an age-dependent consumption tax will be
required to obtain equivalence. Third, we do not augment household income
with lump-sum transfers or taxes. Fourth, we do not allow households to hold
negative asset positions. As a result, young households may ﬁnd themselves
unabletoconsumeasmuchastheywouldlike. Totheextentthatconsumption
trackshouseholdincome,consumptiontaxeswillnotlookasregressive—even
though the observed fall in regressivity is an artifact of a binding constraint!
Given all these departures, it is likely that a switch to a ﬂat consumption tax
regime generates meaningful changes in the economic environment within
which households operate.
2Alternative regimes to implement consumption taxes include making all savings fully tax-
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2. MODEL
The economy is closely related to that in Ventura (1999), in that it features
a well-deﬁned life-cycle path for labor productivity, stochastic shocks, taxes,
and elastic labor supply. There is a large number of agents who consume and
work for J periods and then retire. We will focus on stationary settings where
there is a time-invariant measure of agents of each age j, and, moreover, that
the age-distribution is uniform.
During working life, households’ productivity has a deterministically
evolving component, but is also subject to stochastic shocks. In each pe-
riod, households must choose labor effort, consumption, and savings. After
working life, households then enter “retirement,” which lasts for K periods.
Householdsinretirementareassumedtofacenofurtherlabormarketriskand,
therefore, solve a simple deterministic consumption-savings problem. They
faceonlytheconstraintthattheoptimalconsumptionpathhaveapresentvalue
equal to the present value of resources brought into retirement, inclusive of
transfers.
Preferences
Households value consumption and leisure. All households have identical
time-separable constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions over
an composite good deﬁned by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of consumption
and leisure, cj and lj, respectively, at each age-j during working life, and
a “retirement felicity function,” φ, that is deﬁned on wealth, xR, taken into
retirement.
Householdsdiscountfutureconsumptionofthecompositegoodexponen-
tially using a time-invariant discount factor, β, and weight total consumption
expenditures, cj, in each period by an adjustment for the age-speciﬁc aver-
age household size, ESj (a mnemonic for “equivalence scale”). Effective
consumption is then deﬁned to be
cj
ESj . The problem for the household is to
choose a vector sequence, {cj,l j}J
j=1, and retirement wealth, xR, to maximize
lifetime utility. The absence of labor income in retirement implies that the
value to a household of entering retirement with a given level of wealth, xR,
is the solution to the following problem. Let the maximal leisure available to
households be denoted by l, and let  (xR) be the feasible set of consumption












The overall objective of the household can now be expressed as the sum
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value given by resources brought into retirement. Let  ( 0) denote the space



















Households are endowed with one unit of time, which they can divide be-
tween labor and leisure. Household income is determined as the product of
labor effort and labor productivity. Productivity in any given period is the
outcome of a process that has both deterministic and stochastic components.
We follow Storesletten, Telmer, andYaron (2004) to represent the logarithm
of productivity (wages per effective unit of labor), lnwj , of households as
the sum of three components: an age-speciﬁc mean of log productivity, μj,
persistent shocks, zj, and transitory shocks, ηj. Therefore, we have
lnwj = μj + zj + uj (4)
with
zj = ρzj−1 + ηj,ρ≤ 1,j≥ 2 (5)
uj ∼ i.i.d N(0,σ2
u), ηj ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2
η), uj,η j independent. (6)
Households draw their ﬁrst realization of the persistent shock from a dis-
tribution with a conditional mean of zero, i.e., z0. The innovation to the
persistent shock, η1, is also mean-zero, but has variance, σ2
η1, that is drawn to
help match the inequality of log labor income among those entering the labor
force. The variance of persistent shocks drawn at all other ages differs from
σ2
η1 and is denoted σ2
η.
MarketArrangement
As is standard in models of exogenous uninsurable risks, households of age-j
can save and dissave by choosing a position in only a single noncontingent
bond, denoted xj+1. The economy is a small open-economy setting, whereby
savings earn an exogenous gross rate of return (net of taxes). The household
can also vary its labor supply, both to respond to changes in labor productivityK. B. Athreya and D. Reilly: Regressivity of Consumption Taxes 83
and to smooth consumption of the composite good. For example, if ﬁnan-
cial resources are low in the current period, a household with a given labor
productivity may choose to supply more labor than they would if they had
more ﬁnancial wealth. This is because they would otherwise be forced into
a current period allocation that had low consumption and high leisure, while
their intertemporal smoothing motives dictate preventing a fall in consump-
tion. According to the experiment under study, labor income, capital income
fromsavings, andconsumptionmayeachbetaxedat(time-invariant)ﬂatrates
denoted by τl, τk, and τc, respectively.3 Notice that in this model, given the
abstraction from multiple layers of production of the ﬁnal consumption good,
the consumption tax will also be identical to a value-added tax. Because we
treat the economy as one that is open to world trade and, furthermore, one in
which the households under study do not affect the total demand or supply
of assets worldwide, the interest rate on risk-free savings is assumed to be
unaffected across tax policies. Given elastic labor supply and the three taxes,
the generalized household budget constraint in each period is
cj(1 + τc) + xj+1 =  wj(1 − lj)(1 − τl) + xj(1 + r(1 − τk)). (7)
Optimal Household Decisions
Retirement
Age-J households value retirement savings via φ(xR). The consumption ﬂow
arising from a given level of savings is speciﬁed as follows. Households aged
J +1areguaranteedtohaveaminimalstandardoflivinggivenbyathreshold,
τR, representing Social Security and Medicare. Transfers during retirement
are therefore not means-tested and are given instead by a single lump-sum
transfer, xτ, to all retiring households. Our approach follows Huggett (1996).
A household’s wealth level at retirement is then the sum of the household’s
personal savings, xJ+1, and the baseline retirement beneﬁt, xτR,
xR = xJ+1 R + xτR. (8)
TheamountxτR isthewealthlevelthat,whenannuitizedatthegrossafter-
taxinterestrate  R ≡ (1+r(1−τk)),yieldsaﬂowofincomeeachperiodequal
to the societal minimum retirement consumption ﬂoor, τR. That is, minimal
retirement wealth, xτ, solves
3An interesting extension for future work would be to allow for more general, possibly




( R)k = xτR. (9)
To solve for indirect utility at retirement, deﬁne the budget constraint for
a retiree in period-k of retirement as follows:
(1 + τc)ck + xk+1 = xk(1 + r(1 − τk)) + τR. (10)
Given the objective function during retirement (equation 2), the opti-















at any date-k of retirement can be deﬁned as:
ck = γ kc0. (12)
Given the preceding requirement on optimal consumption growth, we
use the budget constraint to pin down the level of the sequence of retirement
consumptions. First, we iterate on the per-period budget constraint (equation




 Rk = xR,
where xR is deﬁned in (8).




k=0 γ k (1+τc)
 Rk
.
The remaining sequence is given by (12), which we denote as {c∗
Rk}K
k=0,
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Working life
The solution of the household’s problem during working life is simpliﬁed by
our use of Cobb-Douglas preferences. It is instructive to display the manner
in which the various taxes alter the optimal allocation of consumption over
time and the optimal mix of consumption and leisure. First, within any given
period, it is useful to think of a household as ﬁrst working full time and then
“buying back” consumption and leisure. Therefore, if a household works full
time (normalized to unity), has entered a period with savings xj, and plans to
save xj+1, its resources available to purchasing consumption and leisure are
pinned down. That is, consumption and leisure purchases must satisfy
cj(1 + τc) +  wjlj(1 − τl) =  wj(1 − τl) + xj(1 + r(1 − τk)) − xj+1. (14)
Letting  j ≡  wj(1 − τl) + xj(1 + r(1 − τk)) − xj+1 denote the total
“resources”availableforconsumptionandleisure, wehavefromtheintratem-
poral ﬁrst-order conditions of the household’s problem that the optimal mix







(1 − τl) wj
. (15)
Notice that for any given realization of current productivity,  wj, and elas-
ticity of substitution, θ, the optimal mix of leisure and consumption depends
only on the ratio
(1+τc)
(1−τl). That is, the levels of either tax alone do not determine
how households divide their resources between leisure or consumption. The
preceding expression, when substituted into the household budget constraint,
givestheoptimallevelsofconsumptionandleisure, respectively, asafunction






 j(1 − θ)
(1 − τl) wj
. (17)
Given these rules for optimal consumption and leisure for any given re-
sources, the only remaining decision for the household is to choose what
resources to keep in the current period; this is simply done by choosing the
savings level xj+1 optimally. Let U(.) denote the within-period utility func-
tion. During working life, the intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition is given by
U 
cj(cj,l j) = β(1 + r(1 − τk))U 
cj+1(cj+1,l j+1). (18)86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Noticeherethatconsumptionandlaborincometaxesdonotappear, while
thecapitalincometaxdoes. Thisisthecruxofthedistortiontoprivatesavings
decisions induced by capital income taxes. Moreover, as shown above, an
equivalentsystemofconsumptionexiststhatimpliessystematicallyincreasing
tax rates on consumption in the increasingly distant future. This implies
that capital income taxes lower the return to saving and thereby encourage
current consumption; when consumption and leisure are complements, there
is resultant reduction in work effort.
Recursive Formulation
The household’s problem can be represented recursively as follows. At the
beginning of each period, the household’s options are completely determined
byitsage-j,itswealth,xj,itscurrentrealizedvalueofthepersistentshock,zj,
andthecurrentrealizationofthetransitoryshock,ηj.Theseitemsaresufﬁcient
to determine the budget constraint faced by households in the current period,
andalsotoobtainthebestforecastofnextperiod’srealizationofthepersistent
shock.4
Optimal household behavior requires that in each period, given their state
vector, the household chooses consumption, cj, and savings, xj+1, to satisfy
the following recursion:
V(j,x j,z j,η j) = max
cj, xj+1
U(cj) + βE(zj+1,ηj+1|zj)V(j+ 1,x j+1,z j+1,η j+1),
(19)
subject to the budget constraint described in equation (7), and where
βE(zj+1,ηj+1|zj) denotes the expectation of the value of carrying savings, xj+1,
into the following period when the shocks tomorrow (zj+1,η j+1) are drawn
from the conditional joint distribution that reﬂects the current realization of
the persistent shock, zj. We focus on a stationary equilibrium: Households
optimize given prices, and the distribution of the households over values of
the state is stationary (time-invariant).
3. PARAMETERIZATION
The model period is one calendar year. Households work for J = 44 periods,
where j = 1 represents real-life age 21, and j = 44 is retirement at age 65.
Retirement lasts for K = 25 periods, so all agents die at real-life age 90. Risk
aversion and discounting are set at α = 3 and β = 0.96, respectively. The
(gross) risk-free interest rate on savings is Rf = 1.01. Households are born
4 Given that the tax rates are assumed to remain constant throughout time, they do not need
to be included in the “state vector.”K. B. Athreya and D. Reilly: Regressivity of Consumption Taxes 87
Table 1 Parameter Values
Variable Value
β (Discount Factor) 0.96
J (Working Life) 44
K (Retirement Length) 25
Rf (Risk-Free Rate) 1.01
x1 (Beginning of Life Assets) 0
¯ l (Maximum Leisure) 1
θ (Elasticity of Labor Supply) 0.5
with zero ﬁnancial wealth: x1 = 0. Maximum leisure time, l, is normalized
to unity and the elasticity of labor supply, θ, is set to 0.5 to reﬂect that, on
average, halfofahousehold’sdiscretionaryhours(16hoursperday)arespent
working. Ourbenchmarkmodelfeaturestaxesonconsumption,laborincome,
and capital income, and we follow Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu
(2008) to assign the following values for these taxes: τc = 0.055, τk = 0.35,
andτl = 0.173. Underaswitchtoapureconsumptiontax,weensurerevenue-
neutrality relative to our benchmark economy.
Abriefsummaryofthestochasticprocessforproductivityisthefollowing.
We set ρ = 0.99, σ2
u = 0.063, σ2
η1 = 0.22, and σ2
η = 0.0275, as these values
generate reasonable income variability (given optimal labor supply) among
the youngest working-age households in the data, as well as the nearly lin-
ear life-cycle growth of cross-sectional variance in log income documented in
Storesletten,Telmer,andYaron(2004)andthetotalincreaseincross-sectional
(log) income variance over the life cycle. The parameters governing the in-
come process also generate reasonable wealth-to-income ratios over the life
cycle (see, e.g.,Athreya [2008]).
The mean of log productivity is given by the proﬁle {μj}J
j=1 and is based
ontheestimatesofHansen(1993). Weapproximatethecontinuousstate-space
stochastic process for income via a discrete state-space Markov chain using
the method of Tauchen (1986). Speciﬁcally, we use a 32-point discretization
ofthepersistentshockandathree-pointdiscretizationforthetransitoryshock.
We employ standard discrete-state space dynamic programming and Monte
Carlo simulation to solve for decisions and generate aggregate outcomes,
respectively.5 The values of all policy-invariant parameters are reported in
Table 1.
5All code is available from the authors on request.88 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
4. CONSUMPTION TAX REFORM
We ﬁrst report the model’s implications for the aggregate consequences of
a move to pure consumption taxation for several speciﬁcations of income





The means and coefﬁcients of variation for the variables mentioned above ap-
pearinTable2,whileTable3containstheGiniCoefﬁcientsforannualincome,
lifetime income, annual consumption, lifetime consumption, and wealth. The
model does fairly well under relatively high productivity shock persistence
in reproducing estimates of observed labor income and wealth inequality.
Rodr´ ıguez et al. (2002), using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, report
a wealth Gini of 0.8 and an annual income Gini of 0.55, very close to the
model’s predictions under our benchmark model, which features high persis-
tence. The model also preserves the observed ordering of inequality seen in
the data (e.g., Rodr´ ıguez et al. 2002), where wealth is more unequal than in-
come,whichinturnismoreunequalthanconsumption. Therefore,thelimited
insurance that households provide through saving and dissaving is partially
effective but nonetheless results in large wealth inequality.
Our ﬁrst result is that the largest effects of a move to a consumption tax
occur in savings. This is due to the removal of the intertemporal distortion
created by the taxation of capital income, as well as the need for additional
savings in retirement to offset the heavier tax burden faced by retirees who no
longer escape taxation. The magnitude of the increase in average savings is
similar to other recent work (see, e.g., Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu
[2008], Table 3). In the cases with lower persistence, when assets are more
useful for self-insurance, the increase in savings when switching to a pure
consumption tax is even larger. That is, a move to a consumption tax regime
under low income shock persistence induces a larger response in aggregate
savings than with higher persistence. This makes clear that the size of the
distortion created by a capital income tax depends on the shock process faced
by households.6 Of course, the increased savings means increased resources
6 Changes in the persistence of the shock alter the unconditional variance of the shock. How-
ever, given that productivity is a log-normal random variable, changes in the varriance affect the
mean of the level of productivity. When we lower the persistence of shocks, we therefore increase
the variance of the transitory component such that the mean level of income always remains con-
stant. Part of the effect on savings seen is due to the higher variance of transitory shocks under
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Figure 1 AverageAsset Position, byAge




















taken into retirement. However, under a pure consumption tax regime, the




In contrast to outcomes under pure consumption taxes, the persistence of
shocks to productivity does not play an important role in aggregate savings
when income is taxed. The intuition here is that, with capital income taxes in
particular, arranging for consumption in the distant future (e.g., at retirement)
is more expensive than without a capital income tax. As a result, even though
lower persistence makes self-insurance more effective, the distortion created
by capital income taxation makes future consumption expensive enough to
make the net increase in aggregate savings small.
With respect to wealth inequality, the coefﬁcients of variation and Gini
Coefﬁcients for wealth show that a move to a consumption tax lowers wealth
inequality and variability, irrespective of persistence and risk aversion. This
is an important observation for those concerned with the long-run equity
implications of consumption taxation. We also see that, for a given tax
regime, low persistence leads to low wealth inequality. This occurs as lower92 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
persistence makes lengthy runs of good or bad luck less likely. Conversely,
lower risk aversion, by making households more willing to allow for variation
in their consumption, creates a wealth distribution with a lower mean and
higher coefﬁcient of variation for any given tax regime.
Turning next to effective consumption, we see that a move to a consump-
tion tax has a signiﬁcant effect. In all economies under study, our model
predicts that a move to a pure consumption tax leads to about a 6 percent drop
in average effective consumption, while leaving the coefﬁcient of variation
largely unchanged. Persistence matters for mean effective consumption only
at the highest value, ρ = 0.99. However, a move from the benchmark tax
regimetopureconsumptiontaxationdoesnotsubstantiallyaffectthevariabil-
ity of consumption, as seen from the coefﬁcient of variations (cv) shown in
Table 2.
As a symptom of the effectiveness of self-insurance under transitory in-
come risk, we see that consumption inequality falls substantially when the
persistence drops below 0.99. This result does not depend on tax regime or
risk aversion. Looking at Table 3, we see that the Gini Coefﬁcients for con-
sumption show a similar pattern of inequality as the coefﬁcients of variation.
When measured at an annual frequency, the consumption Gini decreases as
persistencefalls,indicatingthatinequalityishigherinstateswithmorepersis-
tentshocksregardlessoftaxregimeorriskaversion. Thisresultisaccentuated
when consumption is reported as a lifetime measure.
Unlike its effects on wealth accumulation and effective consumption, a
movetoconsumptiontaxeshaslittleimpactonlaborsupply. Moreover, thisis
robust as it occurs for all levels of risk aversion and shock persistence that we
consider. This is important, as the elimination of labor income taxation might
have been thought to induce greater labor supply. However, recall equation
(15), which shows that the optimal mix of consumption and labor depends on
the ratio
1+τc
1−τl . A move to a pure consumption tax increases both the numera-
tor and the denominator, potentially undoing much of the change created by
a jump in the consumption tax. This happens in the model on average. We
see in Table 2 that, although consumption falls, leisure remains more or less
constant. We also see that, regardless of tax regime and risk aversion, the
mean and coefﬁcient of variation of leisure rise with lower persistence. With
higherpersistence, eachshockchangespotentialfutureearningsbymorethan
if shocks were transitory. This means that the only way to keep consumption
smooth over the life cycle is to work hard in both bad times and good times,
which makes leisure less volatile. The result that labor supply does not move
much with a consumption tax reform is somewhat telling. Recent work has
made clear that household labor supply can be an important smoothing de-
vice (e.g., Pijoan-Mas [2006] and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston [2008]).
Yet, in our experiments, labor hours and earnings respond very little in re-
sponse to the elimination of income taxes in favor of consumption taxes. TheK. B. Athreya and D. Reilly: Regressivity of Consumption Taxes 93
behavior of labor supply, therefore, provides an additional source of evidence
that consumption taxes do not expose households to increased risk.
Given the relative invariance of labor supply across economies, the
induced stochastic process for labor income is also similar across economies.
For example, we see only a slight increase in inequality as persistence de-
creases, which is reﬂected in the annual labor income Gini Coefﬁcient, as
well as small changes in response to risk aversion. With respect to persis-
tence, our ﬁnding stems from the increased volatility in labor supply in low
persistence states, which leads to more volatile income for agents. However,
laborincomeinequalitydependsheavilyonwhetheritismeasuredannuallyor
over the lifetime. Given any combination of risk aversion and persistence, we
see that annual income inequality is substantially higher than lifetime income
inequality, as realized lifetime productivity will be much less volatile than its
annualcounterpart. Moreover,asthepersistenceofincomegrows,thelevelof
annual income inequality decreases slightly, while lifetime income inequality
increases dramatically. This is because the variance of realized productivity
over the lifetime will be much larger when shocks are persistent.
Measured Progressivity and its Relation to
Consumption Smoothing
Having laid out the aggregate implications of a move to a consumption tax,
we now turn to the central questions of our article regarding the measurement
of the incidence of consumption taxes and the relationship of these statistics
to direct measures of consumption smoothing. To measure the progressivity
of a given tax regime for a given economy, we use the Suits Index (Suits
1977). Let Sx represent the Suits index for a given tax regime and state, and
Tx(y) represent the cumulative tax burden for a given level of accumulated
household income, y, then:
Sx = 1 −

Tx(y)dy.
A Suits index can therefore range between −1 and 1. A positive index
impliesaprogressivetax,whileanegativeindeximpliesregressivityinthetax
regime. An index of 0 is proportional. Table 4 reports the value of the Suits
index across experiments and for three reference variables: realized annual
income,realizedlifetimeincome,andwealth. Ourpreferred“direct”measures
of consumption smoothing are the coefﬁcient of variation of consumption and
the Gini Coefﬁcient for consumption.
The basic input to the Suits index is a function mapping the relative con-
tribution of households ranked by a given reference variable to tax revenues.
However, instead of plotting tax contributions by accumulated percentages of
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curve, the Suits index relies on a curve constructed by plotting the cumulative
percentage of the reference variable against the cumulative percent of total
tax burden on the vertical axis. A given point on the x-axis of the more
familiar Lorenz curve refers to a household whose realization of the reference
variable (e.g., income) lies above a given fraction of households. By contrast,
a given point on the x-axis of the Suits index function gives the accumulated
percentage of the reference variable. For example, a value on the x-axis of
0.3 for a Lorenz curve of tax contributions by income refers to a household
whose income is above 30 percent of households. A value on the x-axis of 0.3
under the Suits index refers to the entire set of households whose collective
contribution to total income is 30 percent. In particular, unless the reference
variable is distributed uniformly, these two measures will not coincide.
Our main ﬁnding is that the measured frequency of income is important
for the assessment of the progressivity of consumption taxes, both in absolute
termsandrelativetothatobtainingunderincometaxes. Bycontrast,measured
income frequency matters very little in the assessment of progressivity under
income taxes. This result is robust as it survives across varying levels of
income shock persistence as well as risk aversion. Each row in Figure 2
displays the Suits function under annual and lifetime measures of income
for a given level of income shock persistence. Risk aversion is held ﬁxed at
α = 3. Since productivity is risky, income is a random variable. Therefore,
we measure income ex-post. In the case of lifetime income, we compute,
using our simulated income histories, realized lifetime labor incomes for a
large sample of households. As seen in Figure 2, the Suits function for annual
incidence lies signiﬁcantly above the 45◦ line for the consumption tax regime.
However, the Suits function for lifetime incidence is essentially proportional.
This ﬁnding echoes the earlier ﬁnding of Metcalf (1997) and suggests that the
presence of uninsurable productivity risk does not alter the implications for
regressivity of a consumption tax. The measurement of income also affects
the relative regressivity of consumption taxes versus income taxes. Figure 2
shows that, under annual measures of income, the consumption tax appears
much more regressive when compared to a regime with income taxes.
As mentioned at the outset, the more transitory is productivity risk, the
more labor earnings are likely to respond to a change in productivity. This
is because the ability of a household to generate earnings over its remaining
lifetimeisrelativelylessaffectedwhenshockstoitsproductivityaretransitory.
As a result, the household smooths both consumption and its complement,
leisure, quite effectively. In turn, households often consume amounts that are
large in relation to their earned income when young and small relative to their
earned income when old. As seen in Figure 2, the lower is persistence, the
more annual incidence suggests that consumption taxes are regressive. Table
4 presents the numerical values of the Suits indexes.96 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Suits Functions by Labor Income










































































































































































When measured by annual income, a move to a consumption tax from
the benchmark tax system leads to more regressivity, and the measure of re-
gressivity increases as income persistence falls. This is because transitory
shocks are effectively smoothed via both asset accumulation or decumula-
tion and changes in labor supply. However, as the persistence of productivity
shocks rises, such smoothing becomes more difﬁcult. Table 2 shows that the
variability of both consumption and effective consumption rise systematically
with persistence. Similarly, Table 3 shows that when computed either using
lifetime or annual consumption, the Gini Coefﬁcient remains remarkably sta-
ble across tax regimes. As with the coefﬁcient of variation, the consumption
Gini falls substantially as persistence falls. The preceding makes clear thatK. B. Athreya and D. Reilly: Regressivity of Consumption Taxes 97
measures of regressivity that are based on annual income may be misleading
for household well-being because they rise, while two independent and direct
measures of consumption smoothing indicate an improvement in insurance.
In sharp contrast, lifetime incidence measures show little variation with shock
persistence. It is also important to note that we disallow borrowing in the
model; more ability to issue debt would further exaggerate the measured re-
gressivity of consumption taxes. Lastly, while not shown here for brevity, the
results in Figure 2 are nearly replicated when risk aversion is lowered below
α = 3. While we have focused on consumption, notice that in Table 1 the
mean and coefﬁcient of variation in labor effort are very similar across tax
regimesforallthevaluesofincomepersistenceandriskaversionweconsider.
Therefore, consumption taxes are unlikely to damage household well-being
along this dimension.
Taxes that fall disproportionately on households with low wealth may
also be seen as regressive. Therefore, we turn now to measures of regressivity
based on rankings of households by wealth. Wealth is a “stock” variable
and so there is no “frequency” dimension to its measurement, but the issue
of progressivity remains: Do the relatively wealthy pay disproportionately
more than those who have fewer assets? As seen in Figure 3, the answer
is no under either tax regime. In fact, the Suits index for tax progressivity
shown in Table 4 indicates that when measured by wealth, both income and
consumption taxes are quite regressive. The measured regressivity of taxes
when the Suits function is constructed using wealth does respond to changes
in risk aversion. As seen in both Figure 3 and Table 4, higher risk aversion
implies lower measured regressivity. This is an implication of the increased
precautionary savings motive under higher risk aversion, which leads low-
wealthhouseholdstoincreasetheirsavingsdisproportionatelymorethantheir
high-wealth counterparts. Therefore, any given quantile of wealth represents
a larger number of households under low risk aversion than under high risk
aversion. As seen earlier in Table 2, neither mean consumption nor mean
income changes substantially with risk aversion. Therefore, the contribution
to total tax revenues of the lower wealth quantiles will be greater under low
risk aversion. In addition to the preceding, comparing the columns within
each row of Figure 3 shows that risk aversion has essentially no effect on the
relative progressivity of income and consumption tax regimes. In terms of
the overall regressivity of consumption taxes relative to current tax policy,
the preceding results make clear that consumption is not inherently more
regressive, especially when a lifetime perspective is taken.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Thesmootherisconsumptionforahousehold,themoreitstaxburdenremains
invariant to its income. Ironically, this implies that when insurance and credit98 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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markets are most successful in delivering intertemporally and intratemporally
smooth consumption, tax incidence using high frequency income measures
(such as annual income) will, all else equal, imply the greatest regressivity. In
this article, we have constructed and simulated a rich model of consumption,
savings, and work effort over the life cycle. We have argued that while annual
incidence suggests that consumption taxes are regressive, lifetime incidence
suggests proportionality. Moreover, for a given level of income shock per-
sistence, consumption taxes do not matter substantially for the variability of
consumption. Lastly, we show that lifetime incidence is similar across tax
regimes, labor productivity persistence, and risk aversion levels.K. B. Athreya and D. Reilly: Regressivity of Consumption Taxes 99
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